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In 1995, the psychologist Keith J. Holyoak and the philosopher 
Paul Thagard published a book about analogical thinking, its 
structure, and its uses entitled Mental Leaps: Analogy in Creative 
Thought. In my paper I will fi rst introduce some of Holyoak and 
Thagard’s main ideas and then go on to refl ect on the possible 
usefulness of their theoretical perspective for the understanding 
of the art of literature.
In the call for papers, we were invited to consider, among other 
things, “contemporary aesthetics … and its place among the hu-
manities and in the larger culture”. I see my paper as being related 
to the conference theme not least because of its foregrounding of 
the signifi cance that cognitive poetics and empirical research can 
have for contemporary literary aesthetics. 
 Several different cognitive approaches – which are not neces-
sarily mutually exclusive – are of patent interest for the explica-
tion of the reading and understanding of literature. Two recent 
books that immediately come to mind are Gilles Fauconnier and 
Mark Turner’s The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the 
Mind’s Hidden Complexities (2002), centred around the concept 
of blending, and George Currie and Ian Ravenscroft’s Recreative 
Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology (2002), where 
the focus is on concept of simulation. When the subject is analog-
ical thinking, the extensive work on metaphor by George Lakoff 
and his various associates is certainly very relevant, and consider-
ing the centre of attention that will emerge later, Mark Turner’s 
discussion of literary works as parables in his book The Literary 
Mind (1996) is even more so. For reasons of space, however, I will 
have little to say about other cognitive theorists than the couple I 
have chosen to deal with on this occasion.
II
No formal defi nition of “analogy” is to be found in Mental Leaps. 
Holyoak and Thagard introduce analogical thinking by describ-
ing it as the attempt to understand a given phenomenon, the 
target analog, by perceiving it in terms of a more familiar phe-
nomenon, the source analog (p. 2). Their opening example is a 
four-year-old boy, Neil, who ponders the question of what birds 
might use for chairs. I quote:
Neil suggested, reasonably enough it would seem, that a tree could be a 
bird’s chair. A bird might sit on a tree branch. His mother said that was so 
and added that a bird could sit on its nest as well, which is also its house. 
NET 33 Text.indd   119 07-02-14   12.10.28
120 anders pettersson
The conversation went on to other topics. But several minutes later, the 
child had second thoughts about what a tree is to a bird: “The tree is not 
the bird’s chair – it’s the bird’s backyard!” (ibid.)
Here, familiarity with human houses, and the idea of some kind of 
structural similarity between the dwellings of humans and birds 
are used to create a frame for the understanding of the housing 
of birds. Human houses and their surroundings function as the 
source analog; birds’ nests and their surroundings form the target 
analog.
In Mental Leaps, Holyoak and Thagard describe fundamental 
conceptual mechanisms underlying analogizing, “the basic re-
quirements for abstract thinking, the capacities that a mind must 
have to be able to break loose from sensory experience and create 
complex models of the world” (p. 19). Further, they defi ne types 
of analogizing of varying structural complexity, types that they 
call attribute mapping, relational mapping, and system mapping 
(Chap. 2, esp. pp. 26–31). They explain to what extent apes have 
the capacity to analogize, and how children gradually acquire the 
skill (Chaps. 3–4). Basing themselves, in part, on empirical experi-
ments, they show how analogies are utilized in explanation and 
understanding and in decision making (Chaps. 5–7). They also 
present “a collection of many of the most important analogies 
that scientists have used”, and they offer “an account of the main 
mechanisms required for analogical thinking in science” (chap. 8, 
citation from p. 185). They attempt to point to typical constraints 
on analogizing, and they sketch computer simulations of analogi-
cal thinking understood as an instance of parallel constraint sat-
isfaction (chap. 10, esp. pp. 240–256). In addition, they pay atten-
tion to the general role of analogy in culture and to its use in the 
arts, not least in literature (esp. chap. 9).
For Holyoak and Thagard, analogical thinking is a species of 
problem solving. The process of analogizing has a typical basic 
structure: “Often a problem solver will select a source analog by 
retrieving information about it from memory (selection), map 
the source to the target and thereby generate inferences about 
the target (mapping), evaluate and adapt these inferences to take 
account of unique aspects of the target (evaluation), and fi nally 
learn something more general from the success or failure of the 
analogy (learning).” (p. 15)
As I have already noted, Holyoak and Thagard view analogiz-
ing as a species of comprehending of unfamiliar matters in terms 
of familiar ones. According to them, analogizing pervades human 
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thinking: “Comparing novel situations to familiar ones and fi nd-
ing correspondences between them, and then using these corre-
spondences to generate inferences about the new cases, is inte-
gral to human thinking.” (p. 262)
It is true, of course, that analogies in themselves prove nothing: 
“Analogy must be recognized as a source of plausible conjectures, 
not irrefutable conclusions. The success of an analogy must fi -
nally be judged by whether the conjectures it suggests about the 
target analog prove accurate and useful.” (p. 7) “Analogies should 
enhance thinking, not substitute for it.” (p. 133)
As I mentioned in passing, Holyoak and Thagard themselves 
have ideas about the roles that analogical thinking plays in litera-
ture. Not surprisingly, they note how analogy forms the basis of 
fi gurative language, not least of metaphor (pp. 213–227). But they 
also ascribe a more global role to analogizing: they suggest that 
literary works are typically used, among other things, as source 
analogs from which readers construct analogies targeting the 
real world. In analogical thinking generally, the analogizer faces 
a given phenomenon which appears diffi cult to understand, the 
target, and has to fi nd a source analog able to suggest productive 
ways of perceiving the target. In connection with literature, the 
situation is, in a way, reversed: the reader “encounters a text that 
may provide a metaphorical source and often has to discover the 
target domain that is the underlying topic”. (p. 225)
III
In my refl ections on the literary relevance of Holyoak and Tha-
gard’s analysis of analogical thinking, I will concentrate on analog-
izing in the “global” role just referred to. It is helpful to have a 
literary example to refer to. Let us think of Nadine Gordimer’s 
novel The Pickup (2001).
The Pickup is a story about a young South African woman liv-
ing in Johannesburg, Julie Summers, the daughter of a wealthy 
and infl uential father on whom she has more or less turned her 
back. When her car happens to break down she meets an illegal 
immigrant from Yemen, Ibrahim ibn Musa, who works as a mech-
anic in the garage to which she turns for help. Little by little they 
get to know one another, and they become lovers. When Ibrahim 
is discovered by the authorities and eventually deported back to 
Yemen, Julie marries him, gives up her work, follows him back to 
his country, and attempts to start a new life in his family home. At 
the end of the novel, Ibrahim fi nally procures visa for the United 
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States for himself and Julie, but she decides to stay in Yemen with 
his parents and siblings while he leaves, alone, for America.
The reviewers did not all focus on the same aspects of The 
Pickup. For example, Susie Linfi eld pointed especially to “the 
desperate power inequities between haves and have-nots created 
by the new globalism”. The subject brought to the foreground 
by Andrew Sullivan was that of “two cultures in search of each 
other” whose “mutual incomprehension is also related to their 
mutual attraction”. Magnus Eriksson, for his part, commented 
fi rst and foremost on Gordimer’s criticism of “a lifestyle that has 
made the children so rootless with respect to values that they 
may be attracted to an authoritarian structure in society and fam-
ily”. The formulations cited are the closest one gets, in the reviews 
by Linfi eld, Sullivan, and Eriksson, to descriptions of the theme 
of The Pickup, of the novel’s “main point, message, or moral”, as 
one recent defi nition of the concept of a theme puts it.
It is obvious from the respective contexts that the reviewers 
are referring to the real world with “power inequities”, “cultures”, 
“lifestyle”, et cetera, not to the fi ctional world. They relate aspects 
of the fi ctional world to aspects of reality. Clearly, part of what 
the reviewers do is point to analogies, or supposed analogies, be-
tween the world of the novel and the real world.
A newspaper critic does not of course function as an ordinary 
reader pure and simple, but it can hardly be doubted that the 
kind of analogizing just illustrated is a common feature of lit-
erary reading. Different types of evidence, included that from 
empirical investigations, could be adduced in support of this 
generalization.
The themes of literary works are naturally important factors 
in literary transactions, so we seem to have discovered an aes thet i-
cally and artistically signifi cant fi eld of application for a theory 
of analogical thinking. It may be objected, though, that themes 
are integral elements of literary works in that they exist before 
the reader comes into the picture. Let us call this the “Part-of-
utter ance-meaning Theory of Themes”. To develop that objection; 
identifying the theme of a novel like The Pickup is part of com-
prehending what the work means. Analogical thinking may play 
some not uninteresting part in that connection, but its role will 
certainly be rather narrowly circumscribed and ultimately sub-
sidiary to the establishment of work meaning, however that is 
thought to be achieved.
The “Part-of-utterance-meaning Theory” represents one way of 
conceiving of a work’s main point, message, or moral. Another 
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possibility is to think of themes not as part of the work’s mean-
ing in the sense just introduced, but as part of the work’s signifi -
cance, part of the readers’ ultimately subjective perception of the 
work’s relevance and importance for them. Let us call this the 
“Part-of-signifi cance Theory of Themes”. To develop that alterna-
tive; identifying the theme of a literary work like The Pickup is a 
matter of reading and understanding the work (establishing the 
work meaning as one goes ahead) and simultaneously making 
connect ions between the work and real-world affairs of some rel-
evance to oneself. Analogical thinking may be presumed to play 
a key role in the identifi cation of themes.
The Part-of-utterance-meaning Theory of Themes is often pre-
ferred within analytical aesthetics. It is adopted, for example, by 
James O. Young in his recent book Art and Knowledge (2001). 
Young says – much like Holyoak and Thagard – that a work of art 
“gives us a way of looking at the world. In order to test the work, 
we need to look at the world in this way”. The way of looking at 
the world that a work of art may provide is however, for Young, 
not something created by the reader in whole or in part. It is 
something the work represents, which means that it is an objec-
tive feature of the work merely recovered by the reader.
I can see two main problems – or one composite problem – with 
part-of-utterance-meaning theories of themes. First, they never 
seem to be able to demonstrate to my satisfaction how we are to 
arrive at the supposedly correct identifi cation of a theme. They 
indicate a general mechanism – according to Young, for example, 
all works of art and literature represent by means of something 
which he calls “illustrative representation” – but without explain-
ing in any detail the step or steps by which the mechanism leads 
us, in the individual case, from manifest textual meaning to im-
plied theme. In other words, a theme-generating mechanism is 
hypothesized, but its workings are neither clearly explained nor 
concretely demonstrated. This tends to give part-of-utterance-
meaning theories of themes a somewhat apodictic character.
This would not perhaps have been so serious if readers had 
been relatively unanimous in their identifi cations of themes, as 
they normally are in their identifi cation of the manifest verbal 
meaning of texts. If that were the case it would be natural to sup-
pose that implicit thematic meaning is indeed objective, although 
it emerges in ways which are not completely understood. In fact, 
however, different readers typically do not discern exactly the 
same theme in a literary work.
The three critics mentioned earlier provide an example of this: 
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Linfi eld focused on “inequities between haves and have-nots”, 
Sullivan on “cultures in search of each other”, and Eriksson on 
“a lifestyle that has made the children … rootless”. I would expect 
part-of-utterance-meaning theories of themes to supply us with 
instruments for deciding who, if anyone, is right in a case like 
this. The looser the analysis is – the less it contributes to resolving 
such questions – the more it appears vacuous to me.
Objections to part-of-utterance-meaning theories of themes in 
this vein are not original. For example, Victoria Kurtz and Michael 
F. Schober reported, in 2001, a study of sixteen readers identify-
ing themes under controlled conditions, and concluded, on the 
basis of the diversity of the identifi cations of themes arrived at 
by their subjects: “The results strongly suggest that themes do 
not reside in texts in any obvious way but are constructed by 
readers.” 
Advocates of a part-of-utterance-meaning theory of themes 
could certainly fi nd a whole array of counter-arguments. For 
example, the aesthetic relevance of what I have here called sig-
nifi cance could be disputed, Kurtz and Schober’s study could 
be critically scrutinized, and the felicitousness of the examples 
from Linfi eld, Sullivan, and Eriksson questioned. I by no means 
claim to have disposed of the Part-of-utterance-meaning Theory 
of Themes, even if I personally would be more inclined to sup-
port the Part-of-signifi cance Theory. I say “more inclined”, since 
I do not actually believe that the Part-of-signifi cance Theory can 
do justice to the complexity of the situation, either – not at least 
in the rather unsophisticated version that we have been consider-
ing. However this is not the place to pursue these issues.
IV
What, then, has come out of the discussion? I have pointed to 
examples of how identifi cation of themes in a literary work must 
be supposed to be grounded in analogical thinking, and I have 
remarked that the aesthetic importance of that observation will 
be greater if we adhere to a part-of-signifi cance theory of themes 
than if we subscribe to a part-of-utterance-meaning one. The two 
theories can certainly be refi ned. Arguably, the aesthetic import-
ance of the phenomenon of analogizing will, on the whole, in-
crease the more the analysis approaches the part-of-signifi cance 
end of the spectrum.
Leaving the idea of hard proof to one side, let us assume for 
the sake of discussion that themes that are constructed and not 
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just recovered by readers will have to be admitted a role, larger 
or smaller, in a satisfactory account of paradigmatic reading of 
literature. In what then would the literary relevance of Holyoak 
and Thagard’s analysis of analogical thought consist?
If we are to work, to a greater or lesser extent, with a part-of-
signifi cance analysis of themes, we need to be able to explain how 
readers construct themes and kindred phenomena. If themes are 
supposed to constitute the ”main point, message, or moral” of a 
literary work this should be a task key to the understanding of 
literature as an art.
Several mechanisms have been proposed for explaining what 
we could call “constructive thematization”. The largest family of 
explanations can be brought together under the vague heading of 
“identifi cation”. Explicit explanations of this general type go back 
at least to Freud’s lecture on creative writers and daydreaming, 
and this avenue of research is constantly in use and constantly in 
transformation. 
Other mechanisms are more cognitive in character, such as 
Gadamer’s theory of application or the theories of Nussbaum and 
others about literature as a source of ethical knowledge (normally 
thought to be tapped, it is true, through a kind of identifi cation, 
a kind of imaginative participation in the fi ctive events by the 
reader). Walton’s analysis of fi ction processing in terms of games 
of make-believe, now seemingly eclipsed by the more distinctly 
identifi cation-coloured idea of simulation, could also be men-
tioned in this connection.
Analogizing, in Holyoak and Thagard’s sense, joins this fairly 
large group. The different models need not necessarily be com-
petitors. It is, however, relevant to ask what analogizing might 
contribute to our understanding of the area, and where its main 
weaknesses may be suspected to lie.
In my view, Holyoak and Thagard’s analysis of analogical 
thinking has two especially strong points. First, the analysis is 
based on mainstream cognitive psychology, and thus helps to 
build a bridge between aesthetic theory and empirical disciplines 
studying human behaviour; it is also supported to a considerable 
extent by concrete empirical evidence. In these respects it is simi-
lar to the idea of identifi cation but distinguishes itself from, for 
example, Gadamer’s idea of literary reading as application or the 
idea of fi ction reading as a game of make-believe.
Second, analogical thinking is a very wide and versatile con-
cept. It is wider than identifi cation (whether identifi cation is 
presented under the label of “identifi cation”, of “empathy”, or of 
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“simulation”). Identifi cation could in fact be called a variety of 
analogical thinking. Identifi cation is always a case of analogizing 
– a connection between the other and the self is established and 
explored – but the converse is not true: analogical thinking can 
be carried out without identifi cation. (For example, to my mind 
at least, it would be to overextend the concept of identifi cation to 
say that four-year-old Neil in our initial example identifi ed with a 
bird when he speculated about what birds use for chairs.)
The wide and versatile nature of the concept of analogical 
thinking may be thought of as a dubious blessing: it is easy to 
feel that the concept is so inclusive that it has little explana tory 
power. I suspect that its value for an analysis of constructive 
thematization in the reading of literature will lie predominantly 
in its capacity to offer a productive frame able to hold together 
other wise dissimilar activities and relate them to one another. 
The more one understood this kind of thematization to be a multi-
farious phenomenon, a bundle of related activities, the more im-
portant that quality would be.
Even when it is viewed in this perspective, Holyoak and Tha-
gard’s analysis of how readers may use literary works as source 
analogs appears to be very sketchy. The lack of development is 
entirely understandable, since the analysis occupies a rather mar-
ginal position in Holyoak and Thagard’s book. Yet the analysis 
certainly leaves many interesting questions unasked about ana-
logical thinking in the constructive thematization of literature.
Some of these are empirical. For instance: Is it actually true 
that readers analogize (as I took for granted earlier)? Supposing 
they do, what, more precisely, do they get out of it? Can readers’ 
analogizing be said to be of different types?
Other questions are, at bottom, normative; for example: Is 
analogizing always aesthetically relevant, or always aesthetically 
irrelevant, or sometimes relevant and sometimes irrelevant (and 
how are we to decide whether or not a given instance of analogical 
thinking in connection with themes is aesthetically relevant)?
Finally, there is also the fascinating, partly empirical, partly 
evaluative question: Does literature, as it is encountered in ordi-
nary reading for literary enjoyment, have special, more or less 
unique merits (and drawbacks?) as a source analog, and if so: 
what merits, and why?
I am convinced that philosophical aesthetics, empirical aes-
thetics, and cognitive science all have important contributions to 
offer when we attempt to answer such questions.
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